The unusual rise and fall of non-monetary trade (NMT) in the Russian transition has been a subject of heated debates. Yet, this phenomenon is often viewed as a peculiarity that one cannot explain by economic considerations alone.
(A) monetary policy which strikes public opinion as being experimental in character or easily liable to change may fail in its objective of greatly reducing the longterm rate of interest … The same policy … may prove easily successful if it appeals to public opinion as being reasonable and in the public interest, rooted in strong conviction, and promoted by an authority unlikely to be superseded.
John Maynard Keynes 2
The unusual growth and decline of non-monetary trade (NMT) in the Russian transition is the main puzzle left from that period. It was a universally unwelcome development that created problems for all affected parties. Enterprises complained that NMT was costly and urged the government to ease its policy of tight money. 3 The federal government believed that NMT was a ploy of dishonest companies that used it to evade taxation. 4 Everyone agreed that something had to be done but differed about what exactly.
This difference in opinions reflected difference in perception of the reasons for NMT.
Economists trained in the Soviet school of thought believed that it was conditioned by a tight monetary policy. They suggested that if the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) would ease credit, enterprises would turn away from NMT en masse.
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Neoclassical economists rejected the hypothesis that enterprises were liquidity constrained. They correctly pointed out that, with easy credit, money holders would try to get rid of unwanted cash balances and bid up prices. As inflation accelerates, they appear to have insufficient liquidity again. Thus the policy of tight credit was not the prime reason for NMT. 2 See p. 203 in The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, McMillan, London 1967 3 According to results of the survey conducted by the Institute of Economic Transition (Center for Economic Forecasting) in October 1999-October 2000 between 86 and 92 % of respondents stated that they would prefer not to use NMT (see Russian Bulletin of Forecasting Surveys, Industry #102, November 2000 at http://www.iet.ru).
4 Karpov [1997] claimed that NMT and arrears were the main causes of poor fiscal performance that pushed the government to accept bad deals (tax offsets and deferrals).
However, the rejection of the proposition that tight credit brought about NMT left unanswered the question of what caused this phenomenon. A sound alternative was hard to find. Ad hoc explanations -such as the legacy of a deficit economy, resistance to reforms, etc. -have not sounded convincing. 6 If NMT was a residue of the old system, why was it not evenly present in the former socialist countries? If opponents of Russian reform used NMT to discredit the transition, why did it fall sharply after the default of 1998 when the reforms rather accelerated than not?
The initial dominance of idiosyncratic explanations for the development of Russian NMT is understandable. In addition to regular barter it included transactions conducted with quasi-monetary tools, such as bills of exchange. Given that the legal system in the transition was initially weak, Russian quasi-monies did not resemble their Western counterparts. The consequent inference was that they represented something else, for example, implicit state subsidization of economically bankrupt but politically influential enterprises.
True, Russian NMT hardly fit the mainstream economic theory. When economists consider a choice between monetary and non-monetary trade, they usually compare the costs and benefits associated with each mode of trade, for example, costs of matching barterers against holding a depreciating currency. 7 We might expect a movement away from money in an extreme inflationary environment. 8 However, Russian NMT started to grow when inflation fell. This could be interpreted as an evidence of its uneconomic (or country-specific) origin. 9 We believe that in order to understand this phenomenon, one needs go beyond theories that presuppose an automatic causality link between inflation and NMT. The latter was not conditioned by the run from depreciating currency, pure and simple. There was a complex of changes in monetary and fiscal policies that, through 5 See, for example, Glaziev, Sergei (1998) . "Tzenntral'nii Bank protiv Promyshlennosti Rossii" (Central Bank against Russian Industry), Voprosy Ekonomiki, January-February 6 A reader can find a summary of the debates on NMT in Seabright and Humphrey [2000] . 7 See Kyiotaki and Wright [1993] . 8 See Cagan [1956] .
inherited market imperfections, led agents to resort to NMT as individually optimal, albeit socially inferior, mode of trade.
Explanations from economists of the Soviet school have emphasized credit constraints and suggested that NMT resulted from monetary shortages. While our analysis comes to the same conclusion, it rests on a quite different understanding of the operations of the financial system during the Russian transition. First, we stress the importance of credit channel mechanism that transmits monetary policy shocks to the real sector of economy.
In this respect we follow the tradition originated by Bernanke [1983] . He claims that processes inherent to commercial banks, particularly a change in their loan portfolio towards less risky investments, exacerbated the Great Depression of 1930s. By no coincidence, both the Great Depression and the Russian transitions were periods when NMT picked up. Second, we justify the proposition of differential access to credit by referring to credit rationing literature. Stiglitz and Weiss [1981] are particularly relevant in this respect. They suggest that, under some conditions of asymmetric information, it is optimal for banks to set the interest rates on credit below its market clearing level.
According to Stiglitz and Weiss, the problem lies in incomplete screening of borrowers.
A high enough interest rate attracts unreliable borrowers who promise to pay but rarely deliver. Thus the expected bank profit as a function of interest rate is of inverted U-shape.
When credit supply contracts but the demand for loans stays high, banks refuse loans to some groups of borrowers. We claim Russian enterprises were credit-rationed in such a manner.
Regarding the fall of NMT after the default of August 1998, one can hardly avoid mentioning the concept of a structural break. In this respect, Sargent [1986] comes immediately to mind. He discusses reasons for the ends of four European episodes of hyperinflation and concludes that in each case a change in the government policy was responsible for this favorable outcome. In spite of its peculiar flavor, the Russian NMT fits the same pattern. It grew against the background of policy inconsistency when the 9 One should keep in mind that NMT was not a feature unique to the Russian transition. Several other former socialist countries witnessed the same development (see Carlin et al [2000, The chapter starts with two sections containing general information about NMT. We start with a definition of NMT and discuss economic differences between its parts. Empirical evidence is presented wth a monthly time series on the fraction of NMT in industrial sales that shows its time path. 10 Also, we consider the difference in exposure to NMT that economic sectors showed and mention how managers interpreted this phenomenon.
Section 3 introduces the main thesis about the growth and decline of NMT in Russia. We claim that poorly coordinated monetary and fiscal policies of 1993-8 sent wrong signals to money markets. The latter were immature and did not correct for policy inconsistencies. As a result, liquidity moved away from enterprises, which responded with NMT. The default of 1998 prompted the CBR to take into account a dire situation with public finance while determining its monetary policy. The CBR sponsored clearance of mutual debts and emergency credit to bankrupt banks injected liquidity into the economy. As credit came back to enterprises, they returned to monetary trade.
In Section 4 we introduce three transmission mechanisms that deflected credit away from producers. First, tight monetary policy affected the allocation of commercial credit that moved towards less risky investments such as government bonds. Second, the flow of money towards the accounts of the federal government made the pattern of public expenditure a factor in the distribution of liquidity. Since the government reduced disproportionately its expenditure on economy, enterprises received less of public money than other groups. Third, the inflow of foreign funds through goods and services account did not result in a general growth in money supply because monetary and fiscal considerations favored a low exchange rate. The latter sponsored the outflow of foreign funds through capital account.
In Section 5 we turn to statistical analysis. We take the monthly series on NMT, which has been introduced in Section 2, four explanatory parameters that we have discussed in Section 4, and build a simple econometric model. The results of GLS regressions support the claim that NMT was conditioned by credit rationing of enterprises. The default of 1998 was an important turning point and it deserves additional attention. We extend our investigation and ask the question about the nature of the structural break that the default triggered. Dummy variables associated with the post-default period are statistically significant thus strongly supporting the claim that a structural change happened in August 1998. Particularly important were the collapse of the market for government bonds and the inflow of foreign currency, which shifted credit back to enterprises. The last section explains why data on overdue trade credit (trade arrears) cannot serve as an explanatory variable for NMT.
NMT Definition and Its Features
Several methodological issues need to be clarified before we proceed with an investigation of non-monetary trade. Let us start with a definition of NMT. We have mentioned above that it comprises several types of trade that do not, normally, involve money. 11 The existing literature provides a rather uniform classification of Russian NMT choosing certain aspects to be decisive. Commander and Mumssen [2000] single out four types of NMT. Apart from barter (spot exchange of goods and services), they distinguish among monetary surrogates (e. g. bills of exchange), offsets (which are the discharge of debts with reversed deliveries), and debt swaps (the practice employed by non-financial enterprises that is similar to inter-bank clearance of mutual claims). In this setting, the main distinguishing features are liquidity (the number of economic agents willing to accept an offered means of payment: goods on spot, monetary surrogates, or contracts on reversed deliveries) and maturity (time elapsing from the creation to the settlement of the original debt). For example, barter has 11 Aukutsionek [1998] considers that money can be used in NMT residually (for example, to cover the difference in the accounting value of exchanged products).
a low liquidity (often close to zero since many products have highly specific properties) and a short maturity (spot exchange) than a monetary surrogate. A spot barter is an exchange of goods and services that participants make simultaneously.
It does not require that traders were familiar with one another though they should be knowledgeable about functional properties of received products.
A trade offset is an exchange that is completed during a period of time. Unlike spot barter it creates a bond between participants. One of them becomes a creditor and the other -a debtor. Because of a potential problem of reneging on debt, traders should know one another to develop a minimal sense of trust. A trade offset is generally less costly than spot barter because of less binding demand for matching of products in time. Thus it is not puzzling that trade offsets dominated in the Russian NMT (see Table 2 ).
14 Kocherlakota [1998] There are not many data sets on the dynamics of NMT in the Russian transition. The most consistent account is the REB monthly series (see Figure 1 ).
As one can see from Figure 1 , industrial enterprises resorted increasingly to NMT in the six years prior to the default of 1998. There were several apparent episodes when the growth of NMT slowed down (notably the second half of 1994 and mid 1997) but they did not change the upward trend.
15 See Commander and Mumssen [2000] and Yakovlev [2000] among others.
Perhaps, the most striking feature of Figure 1 is the reverse of the trend after the default.
Again, although NMT appeared to pick up occasionally (for example, in the second half of 1999), the impulse was insufficient to reverse the downward trend.
Several contemporary surveys help us to understand other aspects of NMT. The first qualifies its reasons that were expressed by its users. Managers persistently blamed the lack of liquidity as the main cause of NMT (see Table 1 ).
Second, a survey in late 1998 shows that the bulk of NMT occurred in dealing between enterprises and their suppliers (see Table 2 ). The least important partners in NMT were the federal government and budgetary funds associated with it. Third, surveys discovered that economic sectors had different exposure to NMT. It was most important in transaction among enterprises producing intermediate products (see Table 3 ). Establishments that produced consumables were the least affected. This finding is supported by data on the use of NMT in sectors not included in REB survey, for example, different types of trade establishments (see Table 4 ). It shows that retail trading was conducted mostly in cash. Another important source of money revenue was export. These, in turn, affected the access to credit by economic agents. A bit of history is necessary to understand the link between conflicts and policy responses that led to NMT. It is convenient to organize the presentation around policy regime changes in the transition.
January 1992: The End of Implicit Taxation and Bank Credit Guarantees
After the Soviet Union collapsed at the end of 1991, the new Russian government inherited a number of economic problems. For our present discussion two were of particular importance.
First was a money overhang that arose from the widespread shortages of the late Soviet period. During that time the government ran an increasingly unbalanced budget. As enterprises received new credit they increased wages. However, larger money earnings were not matched with higher supply of consumables. As a result, households accumulated significant savings. To address the problem of monetary overhang, the government lifted the price control starting January 1992. The monetary authorities hoped that, as the initial burst of inflation wiped out savings, prices would settle on a new equilibrium level. 19 In addition, they envisaged a tightening of credit supply, which, in theory, would restore price stability.
Second, as the old system of implicit taxation became non-operational, the fiscal situation deteriorated. Before, the method of taxation did not matter. The government, being the owner, claimed both taxes and profit of enterprises. After the state allowed enterprises to own profit, tax and profit claims had to be separated. To this end, the government introduced a system of explicit taxation.
One thing was overlooked. In an attempt to withdraw from micro-credit management of the economy the CBR changed its policy of guaranteeing trade loans issued by commercial banks. This change had a profound impact on effective supply of money. In part, the problem arose because commercial banks were dependent on CBR clearance centers, the performance of which became critical for the normal circulation of money.
Prior to January 1992, clearance of bank transfers was a relatively unimportant operation because enterprises were automatically credited in trade. The procedure was the following. When an enterprise shipped products to its customer, it presented a bill of lading (nakladnaya) and a payment order (platezhnoe poruchenie) to its bank. The bank credited the account of the enterprise with the sum of expected payment and forwarded these documents to the customer's bank, which completed the transaction by debiting the same amount from the account of the payee. This system was operational since enterprises were state-owned. When a customer had insufficient amount of funds to pay, it was considered to be in debt to the state. Unpaid debts triggered checks of why it happened but credit was unaffected.
As a result the flow of cash to enterprises did not depend on the speed of inter-bank clearance operations or the availability of bank credit. With enough money at hand, companies could pay to workers and tax authorities. However, when the CBR cancelled its policy of automatic crediting of trade in 1992, the speed of inter-bank money transfers became an important factor in the effective supply of money. CBR clearance centers operated manually and were quickly clogged with a ballooning stock of checks to be processed. Delays in processing led to a growth of float with a corresponding depletion of enterprises' accounts. In its turn, it brought about a surge in trade, wage, and tax arrears.
The deteriorating situation with the circulation of money required a correction of previous plans.
July 1992: Return to the Soviet Practices after Payment and Fiscal Crisis
The government responded to the payment and fiscal crises in two ways. First, it monetized the budgetary deficit to bridge the gap between public revenue and expenditure. Second, it addressed the problem of arrears by organizing a national clearance scheme.
To this end, the CBR ordered commercial banks, which still continued to operate as its functionaries, to create special accounts for enterprises with unpaid receivables. These accounts were credited by the CBR in the amount of receivables. Enterprises could use the accounts only to pay trade debts to other companies, which deposited this revenue in the same accounts.
Eventually, the CBR yielded to pressure and allowed using the special accounts for general purposes. First, firms became able to pay their debts to tax authorities and, later, the accounts were merged with general-purpose checking accounts of enterprises.
However, as one would predict, the infusion of new credit accelerated inflation.
May 1993: Separation of Monetary and Fiscal Authorities
The international community, represented by the IMF, diagnosed the Federal Government's trouble as threefold. First, public revenue could not be increased from tax sources because the fiscal system was in an embryonic state. Second, on the expenditure side, massive cuts should be avoided until the benefits of the capitalist system become clear to the population that had lost savings due to inflation. Third, easy credit and monetization of the deficit were not correct solutions. They fed inflationary expectations and smacked of continuing socialist practices of patronizing government and 'soft budget' constraint for enterprises. Something had to be done. 21 The STF, introduced in June 1993, was an experiment for the IMF. It was created for new members who were "experiencing severe disruptions in their trade and payments arrangements due to a shift from significant reliance on trading at non-market prices to multilateral market-based trading". Unlike other facilities, the STF did not carry other conditionality than not to "intensify exchange or trade restrictions". See IMF Annual Report 1993, p. 60. for the exchange rate, which led to a fall in ruble revenue for exporters as the ruble appreciated in real terms.
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Both restricted cash flow and curtailed credit resulted in enterprises losing liquid funds.
Liquidity concentrated in sectors other than production, such as, government, households, and trading establishments. As inventories mounted and threatened to stop production, domestic producers turned to NMT. This was especially true for enterprises in the middle of technological lines, i.e. producers of intermediate goods, because they were most constrained in credit. 23 On this stage NMT started its steady ascent to prominence.
August 1998: Structural Change in Monetary and Fiscal Policies
This situation continued until mid 1998. At that time, the international community became increasingly frustrated with protracted financial support of the Russian government and disillusioned with Russian transition. Pressure to repay accumulated foreign debts intensified but the solution to the problem of the unbalanced budget was not found.
On August 17, 1998 the government declared a moratorium on debt payments and became technically a bankrupt. As a consequence of the crisis, it sought ways to balance the budget and to assemble internal funds to repay the external debt it could no longer roll over.
Policy-makers found that they needed domestic tax resources to fund governmental operations. Taxpayers' problems, such as financing the production and trade, became crucial. In an attempt to settle the problem of tax arrears, the fiscal authorities moved to negotiate tax schedules with large taxpayers in the end of 1998. Negotiations were considered to be tax concession at the time. 24 However, eventually, tax revenue grew.
With the commercial banking system being in the process of restructuring, the CBR redirected its attention from containing inflation. It now concentrated on debt and credit management of the economy. First, the CBR implemented a scheme to clear mutual debts accumulated by the governments of different levels and enterprises. Second, it extended credit to the federal government to allow the government to pay a part of debts to commercial banks. 25 Third, the CBR took the control over failed banks and managed their loan portfolios. If an injection of credit was deemed to be necessary, the CBR threw 'good money after bad'. Fourth, it abandoned the control over the exchange rate. Fifth, the CBR ordered exporters to sell 50 (70 from January 1999) percent of their export revenue at currency exchanges. Increased purchases of hard currency injected new credit in the economy.
As monetary rigidities were removed by the CBR and the credibility of budget constraint developed, liquidity returned to enterprises. Three channels operated. The collapse of the market for government loans shifted credit towards non-state borrowers. A higher exchange rate increased ruble revenue of exporters and depressed import thus reorienting households towards purchases of domestic products. At the same time, the supply of money grew because net international reserves increased. However, the purchasing power of money was not wiped out by a new round of inflation because inflationary expectations were low. Sargent [1986] finds that credible government policies brought the end of four episodes of European hyperinflation in the first half of the 20th century.
The default of 1998 prompted structural changes in monetary and fiscal policies. They had a stabilizing impact on the Russian economy. Only a small part of the accumulated state debt was monetized. The temptation to solve short-term problems with the help of the printing press was avoided. And the federal government managed to reconcile its differences with the legislature and industrial lobbies and was able, finally, to balance the budget. As the inflow of money to enterprises balanced its outflow, firms returned to monetary trade. The era of NMT came to the end.
This stylized historical account attracts attention to implications that changes in public policy had for credit and money flows, which we discuss in the next section.
Access to Credit and NMT
It is appropriate to start the presentation by looking at changes in the stock of real money in the transition (Figure 2 ). The graph shows that the real stock of money contracted after the transition began in 1992. Yet, this fact in itself does not mean that economic agents were short of money due to exogenous reasons. To demonstrate that the reduction in the stock of money available to enterprises was involuntary, it is necessary to show that they were constrained in cash holdings as a result of causes that were external to them. If they were, one should observe that enterprises witnessed an outflow of money while other groups of money holders increased their Let us move now to discussing the transmission mechanisms that may have squeezed credit out of industrial enterprises and pushed them towards NMT. Three mechanisms were at work. We consider how they operated and that the suggested causes were not determined by NMT itself.
Effects of Changes in Monetary Policy on Commercial Bank Lending
Prior to May 1993 commercial banks received and transmitted the CBR credit to eligible enterprises without worrying whether it would ever be repaid. In fact, they operated as CBR functionaries who handled the distribution of state credit to eligible enterprises and lived on a commission fee charged for this service. 26 Monetary survey is an aggregated balance sheet of the monetary authorities and commercial banks. In Russia, the monetary authorities comprise the CBR, the Ministry of Finance (Treasury unit), and an agency responsible for restructuring of bankrupt banks.
On the assets side, the monetary survey reports net international reserves (see the note to Figure 7 ) and domestic credit. The latter comprises net credit to the government (which is defined as the difference between the federal securities held at the CBR and commercial banks and federal deposits at the same entities), credit extended to public and private non-financial enterprises, and credit to other financial institutions (not controlled by the CBR).
On the liabilities side, the monetary survey lists money (cash and checking deposits), quasi-money (time and saving deposits and deposits in foreign currencies), monetary instruments, and capital and balancing entries.
When the CBR was relieved of the duty to finance enterprises, the monetary authorities hoped that commercial banks would perform this function. They planned to shift responsibilities gradually. First, the CBR realized that banks could not increase their deposit base. They needed regular injections of credit in order to expand their financing of enterprises. To this end, the CBR introduced credit auctions. On a regular basis it offered some amount of credit (determined by the quarterly target on money growth) for which participating banks competed. Second, direct credit from the CBR to enterprises was phased out slowly. Until the beginning of 1995 the CBR extended credit, guaranteed by the Ministry of Finance, to commercial banks to finance agricultural establishment and deliveries to the North Territories on the same conditions as before.
Banks interpreted the changes of monetary policy as a sign that the CBR was tightening credit. They responded by leaving the market for risky loans such as extending credit to enterprises with uncertain value of collateral. Credit auctions, intended to provide funds to firms, almost never attracted a sufficient number of bidders. Instead of working with individual firms, banks moved into nascent markets for government securities (see Figure   3 ).
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This behavior was rational for commercial banks. On one hand, lending to enterprises became riskier after the CBR stopped implicitly underwriting credit given to nonfinancial borrowers. On the other hand, banks expected a bailout with pledged IMF loans whenever the government ran into trouble with debt payment. Moreover, the infamous shares-for-loans scheme, introduced in August 1995, provided an additional incentive to lend to the federal government. The scheme allowed politically important banks to receive shares in large state-owned enterprises as collateral for loans to the state. When the government failed to pay on maturity, as was widely expected, banks "auctioned" the shares to themselves at fire-sale prices (see Blasi et al [1997] ).
27 Methodologically, it is more appropriate to consider total credit to government inclusive of the CBR credit net of government deposits at the CBR because for money markets it does not matter where the credit comes from. Unfortunately, time series on the net credit to government of the monetary survey is not long enough. This explains why we use data on commercial banks' credit to government only. If in the regression that follows we replace the series on government loans received from commercial banks with a compounded series (net CBR credit to the government before December 1993 and the sum of CBR and The rest of banking loans went to the non-governmental sector (both private and public enterprises). A reduced supply of credit was not, however, reflected in nominal credit rates. Some companies were credit rationed. Presumably, the problem lies in the presence of informational asymmetries as Stiglitz and Weiss have discussed in their theory of credit rationing. 28 Banks consider that a high interest rate attracts risky borrowers who promise to pay but rarely deliver. Thus it is optimal for banks to reduce the interest rate and to keep borrowers who really pay back both the principal and the interest. Since the demand exceeds supply at such a rate, banks use criteria other than borrowers' ex ante willingness to pay, for example, the market value of their collateral.
The proposition that banks discriminated against particular groups of borrowers is supported by the fact that the behavior of the real interest rate does not explain the dynamics of NMT. The value of liquidity is higher for some firms than for others. All other things equal, if more firms turn to NMT, it means that the liquidity constraint becomes more binding. This situation should be reflected in a growth of real interest rates commercial credits from the monetary survey after December 1993), the results stay virtually the same. Thus both series can be used interchangeably in statistical analysis.
28 See Stiglitz and Weiss [1981, p. 395] . They define credit rationing as the existence of an identifiable group that, with a given supply of credit, is unable to obtain loans at any interest rate, even though with a larger supply of credit, it would. '9 2 '9 3 '9 4 '9 5 '9 6 '9 7 '9 8 '9 9 '0 0 '0 1 '0 2 Share on monetary credit. However, the dependency between NMT and real credit rate was weak.
Given a potential problem with borrowers' discrimination, it is important to introduce a distinction between producers and professional traders. 29 Lenders' expectations about the value of collateral for these two groups differ. For example, in an inflationary environment or in conditions of high uncertainty about future prices, professional traders tend to build up inventories since they expect to profit on price fluctuations. Such expectations may never realize (with a corresponding drop in the value of inventories) but they affect present prices. Individual banks confuse a speculative buildup of inventories with brisk business opportunities and favor lending to trading establishments as presumably better collateralized. Or, suppose the government receives a politically motivated external loan and spends this money on pensioners who buy imported consumables. Then, importers report an increase in turnover (and inventories) but the output of domestic enterprises stays the same. Again, banks are induced to shift loans towards importers.
Explicit data on the distribution of credit extended to non-financial firms are missing. The monetary survey provides only data on the amount of loans extended to the private nonfinancial sector. To investigate the possibility that credit was diverted, we consider the ratio of the stock of inventories held in retail trade to total industrial output as a proxy for the share of domestic credit extended to trade establishments. This proxy assumes that inventories serve as collateral. When traders increase their stock, they are more likely to obtain credit. Inversely, the level of output signals to prospective creditors the probability of repayment of loans and, therefore, is representative of credit available to enterprises.
The ratio of the two is presented in Figure 4 . 29 Recall that NMT occurred mostly in transaction among enterprises, especially producing intermediate products, and not trading establishment (see Table 3 ). establishments. Yet, there is an ambiguity in this argument. It is possible that banks were less likely to extend credit to industrial firms with contracting output. Then, they resorted to NMT because they did not have money. The latter explanation (and not the former) is supported by the Granger-causality test.
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An additional argument in favor of the causality from credit to NMT is provided by the behavior of the interest rates. Had monetary credit to enterprises fallen because enterprises learned how to trade without money, one would expect that the aggregate 30 Granger causality test is based on F-statistics that measures the loss in the goodness-of-fit when lagged values of prospective explanatory variables are omitted. Specifically, we run separate OLS regressions with NMT and the ratio of retail inventories to industrial output as dependent variables and their one and threemonth lagged values as independent. The results show that we can accept the hypothesis that NMT was Granger-caused by fluctuations in output (F ≈ 7.72 > F (114, 2, 0.01) ≈ 4.81) with less than 1% probability of making a mistake. The opposite hypothesis (that the output fell because of NMT) cannot be accepted: the probability of making a mistake is larger than 5% (F ≈ 1.95 < F (114, 2, 0.05) ≈ 3.08). '9 2 '9 3 '9 4 '9 5 '9 6 '9 7 '9 8 '9 9 '0 0 '0 1 '0 2 demand for credit contracted. Ceteris paribus, the real interest rate would then fall.
Instead, it went up.
Effects of Liquidity Shifting to Households
We have mentioned that changing perception of credit risk resulted in a growth of the share of state securities in the commercial banks' loan portfolio. This shift in liquidity towards the public sector affected money flows.
Consider an example. Suppose the government has obtained an additional amount of credit. If it preserved the structure of its expenditure, an increase in liquidity would flow proportionally to all recipients. However, as it is more realistic, the government has raised funds to cover particular expenses, there will be a redistribution of liquidity in the favor of the recipient.
This is what happened in 1992- 8. 31 Recall that the general idea of the transition was to reduce state involvement in economic affairs. Loans received by the government went increasingly to cover social obligations of the state and not to support enterprises.
Falling liquidity prompted enterprises to reconsider cash flows in their expenditure pattern as well. Here, the ease of conducting NMT with different groups of claimants was crucial. For example, workers were less likely to accept non-monetary payment of wages than suppliers were; the federal government resisted tax offsets more than local authorities (see Table 2 ); etc. This implied that enterprises spent a relatively larger share of money on workers and federal taxes.
As a result of changing cash flows households steadily gained in liquidity both because government transferred to them relatively more and because enterprises reduced money wages relatively less (see Figure 5) . Concurrently, the share of money owned by enterprises fell. The growing importance of the stock of money held by households attracts attention to their spending (and saving) pattern. Three things are important in this respect.
First, in general, households keep a larger share of liquid funds in cash compared to enterprises. As Russian households acquired more money, the ratio of cash to deposits grew in aggregate, which, ceteris paribus, constrained the deposit base available to commercial banks.
Second, most of households' savings were kept at the Sberbank (State Saving Bank).
This bank was a special institution that was required by banking regulations to keep a large part of its assets in the form of state securities. Therefore, more deposits were recycled through "commercial loans to the government -state payments to householdshouseholds' bank deposits" mechanism. Third, households spent relatively more on purchases of imported products and holdings of hard currency. 32 Both these developments led to the deterioration of the balance of payments, the importance of which for domestic money markets we discuss later.
As with our previous argument regarding money holdings -NMT causality, the shift of liquidity towards households cannot have resulted from NMT. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that enterprises have learned how to trade more efficiently but households have not. Then, one would expect that prices on products traded without money should fall relative to prices of goods transacted with money because money trade has higher transaction costs. The opposite was true. Prices of industrial goods (industrial PPI) grew faster than prices of consumables (CPI) during 1992-8 (see Figure 6 ). This implies that NMT was more expensive to conduct, which is not surprising. 
Effects of Foreign Money Flows on Domestic Money Markets
Foreign currency flows also influenced domestic money markets by their ability to change the stock of money in circulation. When a country experiences an inflow of international funds, be it through positive net export or capital movements, its central 32 Households held up to $ 25.7 billion at the end of 1998 (see RET [2002, series 210) . Incidentally, the growth in households' holding of currency almost one for one counterbalanced the current account for 1992-8 ($ 24.0 billion). Thus households effectively sterilized the inflow of money. ' 9 1 ' 9 2 ' 9 3 ' 9 4 '9 5 ' 9 6 ' 9 7 ' 9 8 ' 9 9 '0 0 ' 0 1 '0 2 bank purchases foreign currency with domestic money. As a result, the stock of highpowered money increases.
The process of money creation arising from the net inflows of foreign funds is fraught with inflationary pressure. To compensate for changes in the stock of money the monetary authority may choose to sterilize the inflow by purchasing currency on the one hand and selling government securities on the other. In this way, the monetary base stays the same, albeit its composition changes in favor of net international reserves. The policy of low exchange rate was justified by two counts. First, pegging the exchange rate provided an anchor to domestic prices. Since Russia was under inflationary pressure, containing fluctuations in the exchange rate was considered to be desirable. However, there were two additional effects that influenced the development of NMT. A low exchange rate stimulated Russian imports, suppressed its exports, and prompted exporters to hoard foreign currency rather then converting their revenue to rubles. Thus the on current account was low.
Second, under the conditions of persistent budgetary deficit and tight monetary policy, lenders stayed cautious and charged high interest rates on government securities. 35 A 35 These inflationary expectations affected the credit rate on loans granted to enterprises through the Sargent-Wallace channel. Sargent and Wallace [1981] claim that when creditors observe inconsistency between tight monetary and loose fiscal policies, they infer that the public deficit will be eventually '9 2 '9 3 '9 4 '9 5 '9 6 '9 7 '9 8 '9 9 '0 0 '0 1 '0 2 J anuary '9 2 R ub le/ US$ combination of steady exchange and high interest rates attracted speculative foreign capital into the market for state bonds, often under the cover of domestic banks' purchases. This money was 'hot' and its outflow in the aftermath of Asian crisis of 1997 exacerbated the situation by heightening the demand for IMF cash that was needed to support the exchange rate within the announced band.
The default of 1998 compelled the CBR to abandon control over the exchange rate. As money holders rushed to convert rubles into dollars, the exchange rate rose. However, with a cheaper ruble exports became more profitable but imports declined. The current account balance for three years rose to $ 106.6 billion (1999) (2000) (2001) . The outflow of funds (-$ 54.6 billion for the same period) was insufficient to compensate for the current account surplus. As a result, Russian net international reserves grew (see Figure 7) implying an upward pressure on the monetary base. The monetary authorities attempted to sterilize the inflow of foreign funds. The
Ministry of Finance moved state deposits from accounts at commercial banks to the CBR thus reducing, effectively, net credit extended to the government. The CBR retired a part of net government credit further by selling state securities. Yet, these measures were insufficient to compensate for the inflow of foreign currency monetized. Thus it is rational to change prices on money credit and goods now by the amount of anticipated costs associated with future inflation. '9 2 '9 3 '9 4 '9 5 '9 6 '9 7 '9 8 '9 9 '0 0 '0 1 '0 2
Bn o f Jan '9 2 Rb l and the monetary base grew in real terms in 2000-1 (see Figure 9 ). This additional money went to exporters and producers of import-substituting goods.
Concluding Remark
The preceding sub-sections provided economic rationales for the claim that enterprises faced an outflow of money and turned to NMT involuntarily. We have shown that changes in monetary and fiscal policies, aimed at ending inflation along with unsustainable government spending plans, complicated the access to credit for producers and, specifically, industrial enterprises.
5
Statistical Evidence on the Link between Credit and NMT in 1992-2.
Policy Regime Change of August 1998
Statistical evidence supports the claim that changes in the composition of money holdings were behind NMT growth. Let us repeat the main reasons for the use of NMT.
We have described several mechanisms that transmitted changes in monetary and fiscal policies into changes in the composition of money holdings. They were the expansion of commercial bank lending to the federal government, growing share of liquid funds held by households, increased importance of trading establishments as borrowers, and changes in the stock of money associated with foreign trade. We have argued that these explanatory parameters are plausibly exogenous to the use of NMT.
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OLS regression is unsuited for our purposes because of the problem of autocorrelation of the residuals, which is detected by both Durbin-Watson and Box -Pierce tests. 37 Thus a feasible GLS model should be used. It requires determining how far back autocorrelation 36 The consideration of exogeneity precludes the use of trade arrears as an explanatory variable. Theoretically, NMT precedes arrears since it normally creates debts to be settled with reversed deliveries. Trade arrears appears when NMT has not been completed in due time. For more discussion on NMT and arrears see section 6 below. One more thing has to be accounted for. The default of 1998 represented a potential structural break in the dependency between the variables we consider exogenous and NMT. 39 Thus it is necessary to introduce dummy variables that represent the default. and checking if tstatistics for lagged differences in y is significant. We take p = 13 and find that the first difference is significant for all six variables thus supporting AR (1) hypothesis. A methodology of augmented DickeyFuller test is described in a later edition of Greene [2003, p. 646] . 39 Chow test supports the proposition of structural change. OLS regression presented by equation [1] for two sub-samples and the whole period delivers RSS such that F-statistics is 20.06. The cutoff point for the rejection of the hypothesis of no structural change is 3.20.
40 Specification [1] does not account for the potentially serious problem of spurious regression results. One might argue that since explanatory and dependent parameters are non-stationary, statistical results would show a significant relationship even if there were none. The author attempted to transform variables sufficiently to get a rejection of the unit-root hypothesis. However, such a transformation led to the rejection of the hypothesis of no autocorrelation among residuals. Facing a choice between the results of two tests, the author decided to allow for a possibility of spurious regression. His choice was based on the critique of the practice of automatic following the results of unit-root tests offered in Sims [1988] . The results of GLS regression with ρ = 0.875, the lowest number with which the augmented Dickey-Fuller test of unit roots strongly rejected the hypothesis of spurious regression, were fairly consistent with the results reported below, although the level of significance dropped to the range of 1-15%.
A two-step procedure for GLS is employed. 41 First, we run a regression of the residuals obtained with OLS on their one-month lagged value and find the estimates of autoregression coefficient ρ. Then, both dependent and explanatory variables (Z) are transformed according to the formula
Second, we run a regression of the transformed dependent on independent variables. The results of GLS regressions are presented in Table 5 .
Coefficients for all four independent variables are significant for the whole period.
However, the tests show that autocorrelation is present, the finding that renders t-statistics and the goodness of fit to be uninformative indicators. Autocorrelation tests do not reveal that such a problem exists for the regression with dummy variables and we turn now to the interpretation of the obtained results.
Considering the importance of individual variables, one needs to distinguish between their economic and statistical significance. 42 Judging by the loss in the goodness-of-fit, the dynamics of commercial banking loans to government is the most economically significant factor responsible for the growth in NMT before the default of 1998 (see the last data column in Table 5 ).
Regarding the problem of the structural change, three parameters are affected. The most puzzling is the change in the sign of the fraction of government securities. Technically, it means that government borrowing helped enterprises to switch to monetary trade.
Two explanations are possible. It could be that the relationship turned to be spurious after the default. While the government negotiated the terms of payment to its creditors, the share of its debt grew due to accumulated interest and penalties on non-performing debt.
Thus the growth of the fraction of debt coincided with a fall in NMT that happened because of other reasons. However, one cannot discard the possibility that the 41 We take the GLS procedure from Greene [1990, p. 447] . 42 The author is grateful to Mark Schaffer from the Heriot-Watt University (Edinburgh, Scotland) for attracting his attention to this point.
government borrowed additional funds -increasing its share of debt in the total loan portfolio -to pay the debts to enterprises. In this case, a change in state expenditure plans made a direct impact on NMT by infusing liquidity in the economy. Both processes happened during this time and their combining effect on NMT was ambiguous.
The ratio of retail inventories to industrial output lost its relevance to NMT after the default. Two processes took place. As the price of imported goods grew, household spent more on domestic products. The link between trading establishments and domestic producers strengthened and cash flows were directed to domestic firms. Second, the economy appeared to approach a steady state after the default and expectations of price stability increased. Since professional traders expected less benefit from hoarding of goods, they decreased the stock of inventories. This situation resulted in a higher equalization of the access to liquid funds for producers and traders. Results show that the variables introduced explain almost all fluctuations in NMT over the whole period (see Figure 10 ).
6
Trade Credit and NMT: a Substitute, Complement, or Else?
Some authors argue that the use of trade credit reduces the need for cash balances (for example, Ferris [1981] ). As economic agents complete transactions within a technologically connected network, participants accumulate credits extended and debts received from one another. If they agree on a clearance scheme internal to the network, the agents need to carry money balances that cover only the net difference in the volume of internal transactions plus the trade external to the network. Figure 11 shows values for the real trade arrears to suppliers accumulated by enterprises in four sectors of the economy (industry, agriculture, construction, and transportation). organized around a large company that has numerous clients (a star-type network). The company can pay for the goods and services received with its bills of exchange that circulate among clients as the means of payment for their purchases unrelated to the activity of the issuer. In the end, the bills come back to the firm either as a means of payment for its products or being redeemed in cash.
There is extensive anecdotal evidence about extensive use of bills of exchange in the Russian transition. Generally, we can combine bills of exchange floated by private companies, payment coupons of state ministries, and tax redemption notes under the title of "money surrogates". While there is literature on the topic, 44 we lack data to estimate the impact that such money surrogates made on the non-monetary trade in transition.
The other possibility of clearance in the networks arises within holding companies. As transactions, external to individual enterprises, become internal to the company, it makes sense for the latter to expand its accounting department to become a clearance center or Yet, we think there is a value in mentioning trade credit in this study. First, the proposition that trade credit constitutes a channel of trade independent of monetary trade and barter suggests that a change in the use of trade credit reveals information about problems with its alternatives (or itself). Thus, the dynamics of trade credit in the transition is informative about the lack (or availability) of aggregate liquidity.
Second, the trade credit in Russia has institutional features that affect other modes of trade. For example, the fiscal authorities can block bank accounts of tax delinquent enterprises and confiscate money that they receive until tax arrears with fines are cleared.
Given the accumulation of tax arrears during the transition (see Fig. 11 ), this practice sponsored the resort to NMT, the development that is unrelated to changes in the demand for the real money.
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The growth of trade credit (and money surrogates) has been studied in the context of NMT in the Russian transition and authors arrived at different conclusions regarding the causes of this phenomenon. 47 Table 6 : Results of OLS regressions with NMT and trade arrears as dependent variables.
Sources: see Appendix (for Fig. 1 and 11) F-statistics supports the proposition that NMT causes trade arrears in Granger sense. The reversed causality has not been detected. This finding justifies our decision not to include trade arrears as an explanatory variable for NMT in equation 1. While there is a strong correlation between both parameters, the causality is more likely to go from NMT to trade arrears and not vice versa.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have advanced the proposition that the growth in non-monetary trade (NMT) in the Russian transition of 1992-8 was brought about by financial credit rationing of enterprises. We have found that this thesis is supported with both historical sequencing of policy changes that preceded NMT and statistical analysis of the relationship between NMT and the structure of domestic financial credit.
Placing the development of NMT in historical context has helped to trace reasons for money to leave the productive sector of the economy. It was a complex of changes in fiscal and monetary policies that moved credit away from enterprises. The ultimate cause was the decision to pursue tight monetary policy along with persistent budgetary deficit.
When the Russian government started to borrow massively at domestic financial markets, it redirected credit towards itself, thus increasing the importance of government expenditure pattern on money flows. Subsequently, households accumulated relatively more money that was partially spent on import or lent back to the government through deposits at commercial banks.
The lack of coordination between fiscal and monetary policy became feasible because were not met after the default and inflation did not erase the gains in money supply.
Our statistical exercise has shown that differential access to credit and money for different groups of economic agents (households, government, trading establishments, and foreign sector) influenced the choice of trade by enterprises. The results of GLS regression have indicated that NMT was positively related to the relative outflow of liquidity from enterprises. They have strongly supported the claim that the default of 1998 constituted a structural break between NMT and the credit rationing mechanisms discussed in this chapter.
The finding that credit rationing affects NMT has not been surprising in itself. It is not puzzling to discover that producers do business without money if they have none. More challenging has been to show the channels through which rationing took place and to explain why enterprises returned, eventually, to monetary trade.
This chapter is not intended to be the last word in the discussion on the behavior of NMT in the Russian transition. Several topics deserve a more detailed exploration. For example, the consequence of events that brought about the fall in NMT after August 1998
is not entirely clear. While we have flagged the importance of the structural break and pointed out on its resemblance with other episodes of major changes in governmental policies (Sargent [1986] ), a comparative study of this and other episodes is warranted.
Still, we hope that a reader finds the present study helpful in understanding the complex relationship between politics, liquidity, and non-monetary trade in the Russian transition. 
